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METALOGICAL PROPERTIES, BEING
LOGICAL AND BEING FORMAL∗
§1. Introduction. The predicate ‘being logical’ has at least four applica-
tions. We can apply it to concepts, propositions, sets of propositions (sys-
tems, theories) and methods. The concepts of quantiﬁer or disjunction are
logical but those of horse or water are not. Some propositions, for instance,
the principle of excluded middle, are logical, others, for instance the law of
gravity, are not. Propositional calculus is a logical theory (belongs to logic),
but the theory of evolution is not. In a sense, the problem of logical propo-
sitions reduces itself to the question of logical systems, because we can say
that A is logical if and only if it belongs to a logical systems (however, see
below). Finally, deduction is a logical method of justiﬁcation, but observa-
tion is not. Of course, there are also controversial cases. Is the concept of
set logical or not? Are theorems of arithmetic logical or not? Is second-order
logic a logical system or not? Is induction a logical method or not? And
there is also a general understanding of logic under which every intellectual
or even practical activity should be logical, that is, rational, coherent, based
on sound principles, strict, precise, free of ambiguities, etc. On this gen-
eral understanding, deﬁnitions, classiﬁcations, explanations, predictions and
many other things are items to which the label ‘logical’ is applied.
This variety of applications of ‘being logical’ as well as controversies
around it reﬂect the complicated history of logic. Logic can be conceived
∗ I would like to express my gratitude to an anonymous referee for valuable comments
which allowed me to improve the quality of this paper. However, I must remark that, due
to philosophical nature of my considerations, views defended here are not subjected to a
mathematical proof.
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more or less widely. Logic in the wide sense comprises formal logic, semiotics
(syntax, semantic and pragmatics) and methodology of science. Logic in its
narrow sense is restricted to formal logic only, where the adjective ‘formal’
means, roughly speaking, ‘dependent only on form in abstraction from con-
tent’ (I will return to ‘being formal’ at the end of this paper). The simple
division of logic in the narrow sense and logic in the wide sense considerably
alters the scope of ‘being logical’. For example, it throws out various things
belonging to semiotics (meanings, uses of language, etc.) or methodology of
science (explanation, prediction, perhaps induction, ‘perhaps’ because some
people try to develop logical theories of inductive inference, etc.). However,
there still remain many problems about ‘being logical’ to be discussed even
if we work with the narrow understanding of logic. My main focus in what
follows concerns ‘being logical’ as attributed to systems or theories. On the
other hand, one should remember that if we qualify a set of sentences as a
logical system, we also decide that the concepts occurring in it in an essen-
tial way. Yet I will not refer here to the idea of the essential occurrence; this
device was extensively used by Quine (see Quine 1970, chapter IV) in his at-
tempts to deﬁne logical truth as invariant under substitutions of extralogical
words are logical. The same also concerns the methods of inference gener-
ated by theories in question. Thus, various applications of ‘being logical’ are
mutually interrelated and cross each other at several points.
Every study about the concept of logic that starts with a preliminary
attempt to delineate its limits, points out that we have a plethora, variety
or multitude of logics, and complains that the questions like “What is logic?”
or “What is the scope of logic?” have no uniformly determined answers. Per-
haps it helps when we distinguish here three issues or subcases of our main
question, which are determined strongly by the historical development of
logic itself. The ﬁrst concerns the debate over the socalled ﬁrst-order thesis
which expresses the standpoint that logic should be restricted to standard
ﬁrst-order logic. The contrary view claims that the domain of logic should be
extended to a variety of other systems, including, for instance, higherorder
logic or inﬁnitary logic (see Barwise and Feferman 1985; Feferman 1999,
Shapiro 1991; Shapiro 1996; Woleński 1999 for discussion of several aspects
of this problem). The second issue takes into account the problem of alterna-
tiveness between various logics. The typical way of stating this issue is this:
Can we or should we replace classical logic by an alternative non-classical
system, for instance, intuitionistic, manyvalued, relevant or paraconsistent
logic? Classical logic is here the stable point of reference, and its alterna-
tives are described as non-classical. This distinguished character of classical
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logic stems from two factors. One reason is that classical logic appeared as
the earliest mature system of logic. This historical explanation is usually
supplemented by an evaluation, which consists in pointing out that classical
logic is the most elegant and the most eﬀective in its service for science.
The advocates of non-classical systems argue that there are various coun-
terintuitive features of classical logic, for instance, the meaning of logical
constants, particularly, negation or implication. The third issue is partly
similar to the ﬁrst one and partly to the second one. It also concerns an
extension of logic, however not, for instance, by admission of higher order
quantiﬁers, but rather by adding new constants, namely modalities of var-
ious sorts (alethic, deontic, epistemic, etc.) and constructing modal logical
systems based on suitably enlarged vocabularies. These constructions are
based on some propositional or predicate logic as the starting system, which
can be classical or non-classical as well. On the other hand, new constants
lack some properties possessed by classical logical items, in particular, they
do not obey the principle of extensionality. It is a reason to regard modal
systems as non-classical, even if they are extensions of classical basic logic.
There are several implications of the depicted issues. Usually, if one dis-
cusses the ﬁrst-order thesis, he or she either defends the view that ﬁrst-order
logic is the logic or claims that the property of being logical should be at-
tributed to it as well as to its various extensions, like second-order logic, logic
with formulas of inﬁnite length or logic with generalized quantiﬁers. The sit-
uation is similar, although not so often recorded, when we go to modal logic,
because the question whether extensions arising by adding modalities pro-
duce genuine logic or constitute extralogical theories is a legitimate one. The
a priori answer is not clear, even when we decide that this or that basic sys-
tem is the logic, that is, when we solve the second issue in a way. Now, it de-
pends on many general options how the problem of alternativeness of logics is
considered and decided. We can distinguish (see Rescher 1969, pp. 220–235,
Haack 1978, pp. 221–232) absolutistic (monistic) and relativistic (pluralistic)
approaches to logic. Monism insists that there is one and only one correct
system of logic, and pluralism argues that many logics are to be included into
the variety labelled ‘logic’, relatively to our cognitive needs (non-monotonic
logic is perhaps the most recent spectacular case). There is also an attempt
to ﬁnd a compromise (van Benthem 1994, p. 135): classical logic always be-
comes a special case of alternative logic under deﬁnite idealised conditions.
For instance, non-monotonic logic becomes monotonic in the case when per-
fect information is available. This situation can motivate conventionalism in
deﬁning logic: let us call ‘logic’ what serves as logic according to its practical
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applications. Of course, there is no reason to ﬁght about words. Any claim
that we should abandon terms like ‘second-order logic’ or ‘modal logic’ is
obviously wrong. On the other hand, the properties of logic are not conven-
tional. Logics are complete, decidable, compact, etc. or not. For example,
the priority of classical logic is sometimes argued by pointing out that some
properties of non-classical logic are provable only classically. It is particularly
well illustrated by the case of intuitionistic logic and the question whether the
completeness theorem for this logic is intuitionistically provable. Although
the answer is not clear because of notorious doubts concerning the limits of
methods which are intuitionistically or constructively admissible, we have at
least a straigthforward way of discussing this problem.
The end of the previous paragraph suggests that metalogic is important
for the question of deﬁning logic. Moreover, the equivalence ‘A is logical
if and only if it belongs to a logical systems’ does not solve the problem
of the scope of logic. The reason is that it is possible that the adjective
‘logical’ as applied to single sentences refers to other properties than ex-
pressed by the same word when attributed to whole systems. For example,
the completeness property is a feature of logical systems, but not particular
formulas. It is a reason to look at metalogical properties as guide in deﬁning
logic. Our question is mainly a philosophical issue and we have several intu-
itions, which are commonly accepted as marks of essential properties of logic.
According to common views, logic is formal, universal or topic-neutral, and
provides sound (leading always from truths to other truths) rules of inference.
We also expect that logical theorems are justiﬁed in a simple, mechanically
checkable manner. It is possible to connect well — established metalogical
properties of logic with intuitively accepted features of logical systems (see
Woleński 1999). For instance, the completeness theorem assures, when it
holds for a given logic, that the system in question proves all its tautologies
and does not proceed from true to false sentences. Since, as I will argue
later, this theorem leads to an important understanding of the universality
of logic traditionally regarded as an essential property of logic, metalogic has
a considerable philosophical merit. In fact, exact metalogical results should
be considered nowadays as the main source of insights about logic. Thus,
the traditional approach to logic based on some intuitions derived from the
practice of doing and applying logic is to be supplemented (not replaced!)
by looking at logic from the metalogical perspective. It corresponds to the
change of the centre of logical gravity from logic itself to metalogic. My main
task in further remarks is to show that metalogic suggests degrees of being
logical even within ﬁrst-order logic.
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§2. Definition of logic via the consequence operation. Having the
consequence operation (Cn), that is, a mapping from 2L to 2L (L is a lan-
guage understood as a set of formulas), or the consequence relation (⊢) which
is a subset of the set 2L × L, we can deﬁne logic as the set of sentences
provable from the empty set (Surma 1981; Cleave 1991, p. 76; Surma 1994;
Woleński 1999). Formally speaking (I prefer the way via Cn; see Cleave 1991
and Gabbay 1994 for approaches via the consequence operator, and Hacking
1979 or Segerberg 1982 for related considerations)
(DL1) A ∈ LOG ⇐⇒ A ∈ Cn ∅ or, equivalently, LOG = Cn ∅.
An obvious virtue of (DL1) is that it deﬁnes logic as something indepen-
dent of particular assumptions, which agrees with a wellestablished intuition
that logic is universal. However, this deﬁnition depends on the accepted
properties of Cn. The matter is important also because we have inﬁnitely
(in fact, uncountably) many mappings that transform 2L into 2L, assuming
that L is inﬁnitely denumerable. Tarski characterised Cn axiomatically (the
axiom set given below is adapted from Borkowski 1991). The axioms are as
follows (the symbol ‘fin’ abbreviates ‘ﬁnite’ as applied to sets):
(C1) 0 6 |L| 6 ℵ0
(C2) X ⊆ Cn X
(C3) X ⊆ Y ⇒ Cn X ⊆ Cn Y
(C4) Cn Cn X = Cn X
(C5) A ∈ Cn X ⇒ (∃Y ⊆ X ∧ Y ∈ fin)(A ∈ Cn Y )
(C6) B ∈ Cn(X ∪ {A}) ⇒ (A → B) ∈ Cn X
(C7) (A → B) ∈ Cn X ⇒ B ∈ Cn(X ∪ {A})
(C8) Cn{A,¬A} = L
(C9) Cn{A} ∩ Cn{¬A} = ∅
(C10) A(v/t) ∈ Cn{∀vA(v)}, if the term t is suitable for v.
(C11) A ∈ Cn X ⇒ ∀vA(v) ∈ Cn X, if v is not free in X, for every B ∈ X.
The axioms (C1)–(C5) establish general properties of Cn: the cardinality
of L (C1), belonging of any set to the set of its consequence, (C2), mono-
tonicity (C3), idempotence (C4), and ﬁniteness (C5). The general axioms
do not generate any logic; these conditions (or reduced, for example, by
skipping monotonicity or ﬁniteness) are often regarded as providing abstract
logic(s), prelogic(s) or protologic(s). The logical, more precisely, inferential
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machinery is given by the remaining axioms. Of course, (C6)–(C11) are re-
lated to classical ﬁrst-order logic (without identity, but adding this predicate
does not change anything in my further considerations) based on negation,
implication and the universal quantiﬁer as primitive terms. Moreover, the
formalization is Hilbertian, that is, by schemata. It is easy to generate other
logics, alternatives as well as extensions, in a similar way (see e.g. Pogorzelski
1994, pp. 190, 296 for intuitionistic and minimal logic).
Although (DL1) can be used in deﬁning various logics, it does not solve
the problem which logic is proper. Moreover, this deﬁnition looks as arbi-
trary to some extent, because it seems that the most essential features of
logic are related to selected conditions attributed to Cn . Clearly, the logi-
cal machinery represented by the consequence operation, in particular, the
deduction theorem, is responsible that we can derive something from the
empty set; hence, the empty set serves in (DL1) as a convenient metaphor.
Therefore, we cannot avoid the problem whether that or other stipulation
or constraint concerning the consequence operation proper for logic(s). I
will not enter into the discussion of the ﬁrst-order thesis, which I defended
elsewhere (Woleński 1994; Woleński 1999) or considerations whether modal
extensions of classical logic (or its alternatives) are logics or not. Let me
also leave general axioms without any further comments, although it should
be always remembered that they are motivated by obvious analogies derived
from topology.
An additional motivation for (DL1) is provided by the fact that it is
equivalent to other statements, in the particular following (Surma 1981):
(DL2) A ∈ LOG if and only if ¬A is inconsistent.
(DL3) LOG is the only non-empty intersection of all deductive systems.
Both (DL2) and (DL3) express properties which are surely desirable for
any logic, because we expect that negations of logical principles are incon-
sistencies and that logic belongs to any system, that is, deductively closed
set of sentences. Moreover, (DL3) entails that logical laws are derivable from
arbitrary premises. This last circumstance shows more deeply the sense in
which logic is universal.
The characterisation of logic by (DL1) is purely syntactical because the
concept of consequence operation belongs to the vocabulary of syntax. An-
other deﬁnition of logic is provided by semantics and is expressed by the
statement
(DL4) A ∈ LOG if and only if for every model M, A is true in M.
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The account of logic given by (DL4) sees logic as universal for truth
(validity) of its theorem in every model (domain) which displays another
aspect of the universality of logic, namely its topical neutrality. Now we
can expect a link between (DL1)–(DL3) on one hand, and (DL4) on other
hand. The connection in question is established by the completeness theorem
which, in the terminology of this paper, is given by
(CT) A ∈ Cn ∅ if and only if for every model M, A is true in M.
Although (CT) does not provide in itself any deﬁnition of logic, it is easy
to see how and why it is important for the philosophy of logic. It is so because
the completeness theorem formally expresses the equivalence of two senses of
the universality of logic. Parenthetically speaking, (CT) in its fully general
form does not hold for higher-order logic and modal logic. These systems
require some additional, essentially extralogical constraints on models. The
case is represented, for example by the distinction between general and nor-
mal models for the Henkin proof of the completeness of second-order logic or
deﬁnite conditions for the accessiblity relation in modal frames, except the
system K, which for this reason serves as the basic normal modal logic. It
provides a strong motivation for any logic for which (CT) holds in its un-
restricted form. However, the fact that metatheory, necessary for proving
metalogical properties (or their lack) of alternative logics, is based on classi-
cal ﬁrst-order logic strongly motivates this system as the logic. Anyway, my
further remarks are restricted to classical logic.
§3. Are there degrees of being logical? The former considerations
suggest that the property expressed by the predicate ‘being logical’ is for-
mally articulated by (DL1)–(DL3) and their equivalence with (DL4). It
is correct but we can go further in characterising being logical. In or-
der to do it let us consider two other metalogical properties, namely Post-
completeness and decidability, assuming (C1)–(C5) as abstract properties of
any logical consequence operation. A system S is Post-complete if and only
if Cn(S ∪ {A}) = L, for any formula A which is not a theorem of S (I ne-
glect here some subtleties connected with various ways of formalizing logic
depending on using concrete formulas or schemata and on the stock of rules;
strictly speaking, the above deﬁnition applies to propositional logic with the
rule of substitution, but there is also a corresponding property for systems
presented by schemata). Further, S is decidable if and only if the set of its
theorems is recursive.
© 2002 by Nicolaus Copernicus University
218 Jan Woleński
A natural stratiﬁcation of ﬁrst-order (elementary) logic is to divide it into
propositional calculus and (ﬁrst-order) predicate calculus. Both are consis-
tent, semantically complete (that is, obey (CT)) and syntactically incomplete
(a system S is syntactically incomplete if and only if there are the formulas
A and ¬A belonging to the language of S, such that both are not provable
in this system. We also have that for any formula of the language of propo-
sitional (predicate) logic, it is a tautology (theorem) or non-tautology (non-
theorem). However, diﬀerent results arise when non-tautologies are added to
propositional calculus and when we add non-tautologies to predicate logic.
The resulting system is inconsistent in the ﬁrst case, but does not need to be
such in the second. For instance, we can add a sentence, which asserts that
there are n objects to predicate logic without producing its inconsistency.
The reason is that propositional calculus is Post-complete, but predicate
logic is not. Let us agree that that Post-completeness expresses an aspect of
being logical. Hence, we can conclude that propositional calculus (deﬁned by
(C1)–(C9)) is logical in a stronger sense than predicate logic. Of course, this
view is related to the considered metalogical property, but we have reasons to
look at the systems becoming inconsistent by adding non-theorems to them
as somehow more logical than the systems behaving otherwise. The same
(see above) concerns decidability, because propositional calculus is decid-
able, but predicate logic is not. Still another diﬀerence consists in methods
of proving (CT) for propositional calculus and predicate logic. First of all,
(CT) for propositional calculus is equivalent to the theorem that this system
is Post-complete. Moreover, both theorems are constructively provable even
under the most severe understanding of constructivity (perhaps except the
ultraintutionistic sense on which only “small” ﬁnite methods are admissible).
A completely diﬀerent situation holds for predicate logic. It is true that we
can prove by constructive methods, that is, formalizable in the ﬁnitary syn-
tax that (CT) is equivalent to the Gödel–Malcev theorem (S is consistent
if and only if it has a model), which is another version of the completeness
theorem. On the other hand, proofs of both forms of the completeness theo-
rem require non-constructive methods. In fact, opposite views expressed for
example in Grandy 1977, pp. 21–36 or Stekeler-Weithofer 1986, p. 520, that
(CT) in predicate calculus has an eﬀective proof are due to a too wide under-
standing of constructivity; this fact conﬁrms the earlier mentioned vagueness
concerning the scope of methods regarded as constructive). The indicated
diﬀerences between both parts of elementary logic might be interpreted as
degrees of being logical, because non-constructive proofs involve semantic
ingredients exceeding purely syntactic devices. The latter are traditionally
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considered as the paradigm of logical methods. According to this interpre-
tation, the property of being logical has, so to speak, a diﬀerent intensity in
both parts of elementary logic, greater in the case of propositional calculus
and lesser in the case of predicate logic.
It seems that these degrees of being logical depend upon the relation
between syntax and semantics in logical theories. The completeness the-
orem established the parity or equivalence between syntax and semantics
in the case of ﬁrst-order logic. However, this harmony is not equal in its
concrete features in the whole domain of ﬁrst-order logic. Decidability and
Post-completeness, as metalogical properties, decide that semantics of propo-
sitional calculus is fully constructive and can be replaced without any remain-
der by the syntax of this system. In fact, truth-tables as devices of checking
whether formulas are tautologies or not, admit a semantic as well as syntac-
tic interpretation. On the other hand, the parity of syntax and semantics in
predicate logic is not full in the sense that the latter is not replaceable by the
former. Thus, although we know that every tautology (a sentence universally
valid) is a theorem (is provable in predicate calculus), we have no general
decision method for theoremhood. It shows that, beyond propositional cal-
culus, semantics is somehow prior to syntax. The priority of semantics over
syntax was commonly recognized as a general consequence of limitative the-
orems of Gödel (incompletenesss of arithmetic) and Tarski (undeﬁnability
of arithmetical truth in arithmetic). However, this phenomenon was rather
related to arithmetic and its oversystems. The foregoing considerations show
that the distinguished role of semantics appears just in the case of predicate
logic, in spite of the completeness theorem, which suggests that syntax and
semantics are al pari in elementary logic. In particular, semantic properties
of the whole ﬁrst-order logic are not fully expressible in its syntax. As an
outcome of this observation we have that a purely syntactic characterization
of logic is proper only in the case of propositional calculus.
Now taking incompleteness into account, we can identify further ‘degrees
of . . . ’. Although arithmetic shares undecidability with predicate logic, it is
also incomplete and not ﬁnitary axiomatizable. In order to have its semantic
completeness, we must supplement its inference rules by the ω–rule which
operates on inﬁnite sets of premises. This fact is at odds with the axiom
(C5) for Cn, which implies that inference rules are ﬁnitary in the sense that
they apply to inferences from a ﬁnite set of assumptions. The dots after the
last occurrence of ‘degree of’ are introduced quite intentionally, because I do
not regard arithmetic (or formal systems strong enough to express it) as a
part of logic (see Woleński 1995; Woleński 1995a). In particular, I claim that
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logic ends where the parity, even not perfect, of syntax and semantics loses its
validity. However, we can embed this new application of ‘degree of’ in a more
general scheme. Let us agree that particular collections of metamathematical
properties are associated with degrees of ‘being formal’. Traditionally, logic
is considered as a formal science, and mathematics is another member of this
family. We can think about being logical as a special case of being formal.
We can think about a hierarchy, which starts with propositional calculus,
proceeds through predicate logic and reaches arithmetic (and the rest of
pure mathematics). Two ﬁrst points comprise being logical, although not
in the same amount, and the third place is occupied by something, which
is formal and extralogical. It is possible to diversify the third realm by
other hierarchies, for instance, arithmetical or analytic. There is a clear
connection between the traditional understanding of ‘formal’ as opposed to
‘having content’, and that proposed here. If we proceed from being more
logical to being less logical, and the degree from logical to non-logical, the
amount of being formal is lesser. It means that the contentual parameter
becomes greater. I do not think that even propositional calculus is completely
free of content, that is, purely formal in the traditional sense, because a
certain amount of content, for example coming from the metatheory, appears
in deﬁnitions of logical constants. However, propositional calculus is more
formal than predicate logic in the sense that semantic properties of the former
are fully explicable in its syntax. Thus the degree of being formal is measured
according to the relation between syntax and semantics in a given theory.
In a sense, if the degree of being formal increases, the amount of content
decreases. And this is what we should expect.
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